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PUBLIC LAW-FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT-"WORKING
PAPERS" EXEMPTION APPLIES NOT ONLY TO OFFICEHOLDER
PERSONALLY BUT TO STAFF MEMBERS AND PRIVATE CONSULTANTS
AS WELL. Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 830 S.W.2d 869
(1992).
I. FACTS
On July 22, 1991, Thomas A. Mars, an attorney representing
Arkansas Western Gas Company in a utility rate case pending
before the Arkansas Public Service Commission, served discovery
requests on Arkansas Attorney General Winston Bryant, who
represented utility ratepayers.' Mars sought production of infor-
mation gathered by Attorney General Bryant and other information
relating to the case generated by Mitchell & Mitchell, an outside
consulting firm. 2 Mars served interrogatories on Attorney General
Bryant. The Attorney General objected to the requests.
3
On the same day, Mars filed a written request under the
Freedom of Information Act 4 (FOIA) to inspect documents in the
offices of the Attorney General and the consulting firm. 5 The
Attorney General made available for inspection all documents that
he deemed not to be exempt from disclosure under the working
papers exemption 6 of the FOIA. 7 Mars was not allowed to inspect
documents prepared by staff members in the Attorney General's
office or documents generated by the private consultants.
8
After his request to inspect the documents was refused, Mars
filed suit under the FOIA to compel disclosure of documents that
1. Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 481, 830 S.W.2d 869, 869 (1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -107 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993). The
FOIA was enacted to provide access to public documents and meetings with the
goal of encouraging active participation in the governmental process. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 25-19-102 (Michie 1992).
5. 309 Ark. at 481, 830 S.W.2d at 869-70. Mars did not request any memoranda,
working papers, or correspondence created by the Attorney General himself. Id.
at 481, 830 S.W.2d at 870.
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(7) (Michie Supp. 1993). Exempted from
FOIA disclosure are "[u]npublished memoranda, working papers, and correspon-
dence of the Governor, members of the General Assembly, Supreme Court Justices,
and the Attorney General." Id.
7. 309 Ark. at 481, 830 S.W.2d at 870.
8. Id.
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were not "personally created by the Attorney General." 9 The trial
court ruled that the FOIA working papers exemption'0 covered only
memoranda, working papers, and correspondence of the Attorney
General himself and not records "created, prepared, obtained,
gathered, or assembled by, or provided or furnished to, members
of the Attorney General's staff or private consultants."" The trial
court stayed its ruling pending appeal.'
2
On appeal, the Attorney General presented three arguments to
the Arkansas Supreme Court: (1) the Supreme Court is not bound
by the decision of the trial court;3 (2) the trial court erred in
finding that the working papers exemption applies only to the
Attorney General personally; 4 and (3) the working papers exemption
should apply to all documents "prepared, collected, or assembled
by . . . the Attorney General's staff" and outside consultants. 5
On May 26, 1992, the Arkansas Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed the action. 16 The
Supreme Court found that the trial court "erroneously construed
the effect of the statutory exemption" and that its interpretation
of the working papers exemption was too restrictive.'
7
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
At common law, there was no general right to inspect gov-
ernment documents.' 8 Eventually, however, the common law did
recognize a limited right to inspect government documents in certain
circumstances.' 9 As early as 1815 English courts recognized a "lit-
igation interest" rule which provided litigating parties some access
9. Id.
10. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(7) (Michie Supp. 1993).
il1.u," 309i A-rk. at 4,42 , o ,.1 2.1 at 0.704-aO. -O . C'l tU .... O'7f°
12. Appellants' Brief at A-33, Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 830 S.W.2d 869
(1992) (No. 91-262).
13. 309 Ark. at 482, 830 S.W.2d at 870.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 486, 830 S.W.2d at 872.
17. Id. at 482, 830 S.W.2d at 870.
18. John J. Watkins, Access to Public Records Under the Arkansas Freedom
of Information Act, 37 ARK. L. REv. 741, 744 (1984) (citing H. CROSS, THE
PEOPLE's RIGHT TO KNOW 25 (1953)). Professor Watkins, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Arkansas, B.J. 1970, M.A. 1971, J.D. 1976, University of Texas, a
leading authority on the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, served as counsel
to Mars in Bryant.
19. John J. Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Infor-




to information. 20 That judicially created rule ultimately grew to
encompass parties who sought to protect the public interest, usually
by calling into question financial irregularities or some similar
dereliction of duty.
2'
In the United States, the right to inspect government documents
also originated primarily in the courts. 22 By 1940, only twelve states
had public information statutes resembling those currently in force. 2.
Prior to adoption of a freedom of information statute in
Arkansas, the state supreme court was progressive in permitting
access to public records.24 As early as 1915, the court took an
expansive view of allowing public access to government documents.
25
In Bowden v. Webb,26 the court disagreed with county election
commissioners who argued that election poll books were not open
to public inspection. 27 The court determined that, although the
actual ballots were secret,2 the poll books were "public records"
and thus subject to inspection. 29 The court continued this expansive
view in 1933 in Brooks v. Pullen,3" another case involving election
judges who denied public access to tally sheets and poll books a.3
The court held that the records were open to "all persons. '3 2 Three
later cases involving statutes, one in the late 1950's33 and two in
the mid-1960's, 34 continued the court's liberal trend of allowing
access to public documents.
20. Watkins, supra note 18, at 744.
21. Watkins, supra note 18, at 744.
22. William R. Henrick, Comment, Public Inspection of State and Municipal
Executive Documents: "Everybody, Prdctically Everything, Anytime, Ex-
cept . . . . " 45 FoRarn L. REv. 1105, 1107 (1977). Only a few states enacted
early statutes granting inspection rights. Id. One such state, Wisconsin, provided
limited access by statute as early as 1849. Id. at 1105 (citing L. AmiCO, STATE
OPEN RECORDS LAWS: AN UPDATE 2 (1976) (FOI Center, Columbia, Mo.)).
23. Henrick, supra note 22, at 1107. These states were Alabama, California,
Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Car-
olina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Henrick, supra note 22, at 1107 n.10.
24. Jom J. WATKINS, TrE ARKAsAs FREEDOM OF INrORMATIoN ACT 3 (1988).
25. See Bowden v. Webb, 116 Ark. 310, 173 S.W. 181 (1915).
26. 116 Ark. 310, 173 S.W. 181 (1915).
27. Id. at 315, 173 S.W. at 183.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 315-16, 173 S.W. at 183.
30. 187 Ark. 80, 58 S.W.2d 682 (1933).
31. Id. at 81, 58 S.W.2d at 683.
32. Id. at 84, 58 S.W.2d at 684.
33. Baker v. Boone, 230 Ark. 843, 327 S.W.2d 85 (1959). The court in Baker
upheld the right of candidates to examine voter lists. Id.
34. Whorton v. Gaspard, 239 Ark. 715, 393 S.W.2d 773 (1965) (regarding voter
lists); Gaspard v. Whorton, 239 Ark. 849, 394 S.W.2d 621 (1965) (regarding absentee
19941
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In Collins v. State," where a deputy was accused of embezzling
public money, the court required disclosure of audit records of a
sheriff's office.36 The court upheld the deputy's conviction,37 but
ruled that summaries of audit records to which the defendant had
been denied access were public records and, therefore, available
for inspection.3"
In Republican Party v. State ex rel. Hall,3 9 the court required
the state treasurer to release a list of banks in which state money
was held.40 Expressing dismay that disclosure was even at issue, 4'
the court declared that the list was "a part of the public transactions
of the office ' 42 and thus subject to inspection.
4 3
Arkansas adopted the Freedom of Information Act in 1967,
thereby guaranteeing access to public records and meetings. 4 Several
attempts to enact the FOIA occurred in the twenty years before
its passage, 45 but a series of events in the 1960's combined to
voting records). The court in the latter case observed that "the denial to the public
of reasonable access-to public records . . . is not conducive to the perpetuation
of our form of government." Gaspard, 239 Ark. at 850, 394 S.W.2d at 622.
35. 200 Ark. 1027, 143 S.W.2d 1 (1940).
36. Id. at 1042-43, 143 S.W.2d at 9.
37. Id. at 1043, 143 S.W.2d at 9.
38. Id. The court ruled that the defendant had waived his right to object and,
therefore, the denial of access to the summaries was not prejudicial. Id. at 1040-
41, 143 S.W.2d at 8.
39. 240 Ark. 545, 400 S.W.2d 660 (1966).
40. Id. at 549, 400 S.W.2d at 662. The court, rejecting the argument that there
was no common law right of access to public records, stated that "if there be
any rule of the English common law that denies the public the right of access to
public records, it is repugnant to the spirit of our democratic institutions." Id.
41. Id. at 547, 400 S.W.2d at 662.
42. Id. at 548, 400 S.W.2d at 662.
43. Id. at 549, 400 S.W.2d at 662.
44. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -107 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993). The
policy goals of the legislature in enacting the FOIA were expressly set forth in the
Act:
It is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed in
an open and public manner so that the electors shall be advised of the
performance of public officials and of the decisions that are reached in
public activity and in making public policy. Toward this end, this chapter
is adopted, making it possible for them, or their representatives to learn
and to report fully the activities of their public officials.
AiuK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (Michie 1992).
45. See generally Watkins, supra note 18, at 741-51. See also John J. Watkins,
Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 ARK. L. REv.
268 (1984). The initial attempts were made by members of the Arkansas press
corps and principally dealt with gaining access to public meetings. Watkins, supra
note 18, at 749. The Arkansas legislature in 1947 passed the first open meetings
statute. Watkins, supra note 18, at 750 n.42. That statute affected only state
[Vol. 16:313
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produce a clearer need for the Act.46
For a record to be subject to disclosure under the FOIA, it
must be in the possession of an entity covered by the Act, fall
within the Acts definition of "public records," and not be spe-
cifically exempted by statute. 47 Several exemptions are provided for
within the FOIA,48 and others may be found elsewhere in Arkansas
statutes .49
In 1968, the Arkansas Supreme Court first construed the FOIA
in Laman v. McCord.5 ° This case arose because members of the
government, not county or municipal agencies. Watkins, supra note 18, at 750
n.42. By 1952 the statute was virtually useless. Watkins, supra note 18, at 750
n.42. In 1953, the General Assembly passed an open meetings statute that was to
apply to local governmental agencies as well. Watkins, supra note 18, at 751 n.46.
Although the legislature specifically made available for public inspection two types
of records, the 1953 statute contained no general open records provision. Acts of
1953, No. 78, § I and No. 90, § 1. These statutes dealt with franchise and license
records and accident reports. Act 90 remains in effect today. See ARK. CODE ANN.
88 27-53-209 to -210 (Michie 1994) (regarding accident reports).
46. Watkins, supra note 18, at 752. These events included a renewed effort by
Arkansas journalists to make government meetings and records more accessible,
an Arkansas Legislative Council study delineating the differences between Arkansas
law and other states, and several closed meetings by government officials that
created great controversy. Watkins, supra note 18, at 752. Additionally, Winthrop
Rockefeller, a progressive Republican, was elected governor. Watkins, supra note
18, at 752.
47. Legislative Joint Auditing Comm. v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 90, 722 S.W.2d
581, 582 (1987) (citing Watkins, supra note 18, at 741 (1984)).
48. The following exemptions are among those included in section 4 of the
Act:
(1) State income tax records;
(2) Medical records, scholastic records, and adoption records;
(3) The site files and records maintained by the Arkansas Historic Pres-
ervation Program and the Arkansas Archaeological Survey;
(4) Grand jury minutes;
(5) Unpublished drafts of judicial or quasi-judicial opinions and decisions;
(6) Undisclosed investigations by law enforcement agencies of suspected
criminal activity;
(7) Unpublished memoranda, working papers, and correspondence of the
Governor, members of the General Assembly, Supreme Court Justices,
and the Attorney General;
(8) Documents which are protected from disclosure by order or rule of
court;
(9) (A) Files which, if disclosed, would give advantage to competitors or
bidders; and (B) Records maintained by the Arkansas Industrial Devel-
opment Commission related to any business entity's planning, site location,
expansion, operations, or product development and marketing ... and
(10) Personnel records to the extent that disclosure would constitute clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b) (Michie Supp. 1993).
49. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18-303(a)(1) to (a)(2)(A) (Michie Supp.
1993).
50. 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
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news media and the public had been excluded from a closed session
of the North Little Rock City Council, which had met with the
city attorney to discuss impending litigation.- The court rejected
the city's argument that it could not adequately prepare for a case
if the city council was unable to meet privately with the city
attorney.5 2 Analogizing municipal government to state government,
the court held that the city attorney could as effectively prepare
its case without meeting behind closed doors with the city council
as the state's Attorney General could without meeting privately
with members of the General Assembly."
Writing for the court, Justice George Rose Smith lauded the
goals of the FOIA and determined that it was passed solely in
the interest of the public, the Act must be liberally interpreted.
5 4
In this first construction of the FOIA, the court held that the
FOIA is to be liberally interpreted. The legislature did not spe-
cifically exempt a meeting between the city council and city at-
torney; because no exemption existed, the court's liberal construction
of the FOIA mandated that the meeting be deemed open to the
public. 55
In its second case construing FOIA exemptions,5 6 the court
held that the policies behind the Laman rule of liberal interpretation
of the Act did not demand a conclusion that the policies considered
in creating an exemption to the Act"1 were less praiseworthy or
"to be any more lightly regarded."15 8 In other words, a policy goal
that favored an exemption was as important as a policy goal that
favored a more liberal interpretation of the Act. The court sug-
gested only that exemptions should be more narrowly construed.
5 9
51. Id. at 402, 432 S.W.2d at 754.
52. Id, at 405-06; 432 S.W.2d at 755-56.
53. Id. at 405, 432 S.W.2d at 755.
54. Id. at 404-05, 432 S.W.2d at 755.
55. Id. at 405-06, 432 S.W.2d at 755-56.
56. Commercial Printing Co. v. Rush, 261 Ark. 468, 549 S.W.2d 790 (1977).
57. At issue in Commercial Printing was the personnel exemption. Arkansas
law then provided:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all meetings formal or
informal, special or regular, of ... all boards, bureaus, commissions, or
organizations of the State of Arkansas ... supported wholly or in part
by public funds, or expending public funds shall be public meetings....
Executive [closed] sessions will be permitted only for the purpose of
discussing or considering employment, appointment, promotion, demotion,
disciplining, or resignation of any public officer or employee.
261 Ark. at 473, 549 S.W.2d at 793 (quoting Ani. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (Repl.
1968)).




A 1986 case6O continued the trend in FOIA cases of liberally
interpreting the statute. 61 The court held that if an exemption is
not found in the FOIA, or if legislative intent is unclear, then
disclosure is required.
62
In McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 63 a man apparently
killed his wife, his children, and then himself. Police found notes,
diaries, and letters addressed to the man's lawyer and mother. 4
The court refused to create an attorney-client exemption to the
FOIA, which would have prevented public disclosure of those
items. 65 Holding that exemptions should be construed narrowly
"to counterbalance the self-protective instincts of the governmental
bureaucracy," 66 the court concluded that the attorney-client priv-
ilege is an evidentiary rule limited to court proceedings and does
not apply outside the scope of those proceedings. 67
Before a document is made available for public inspection
under the FOIA, it must be determined that the requested document
is not subject to any specific exemption. 68 States have enacted
60. Ragland v. Yeargan, 288 Ark. 81, 702 S.W.2d 23 (1986). At issue in Ragland
was whether the revenue commissioner was required to disclose motor fuel tax
information under the FOIA. The applicable statute provides:
(a)(1) The director is the official custodian of all records and files
required by any state tax law to be filed with the director and is required
to take all steps necessary to maintain their confidentiality.
(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, the records and
files of the director concerning the administration of any state tax law
are confidential and privileged. These records and files and any information
obtained from these records or files or from any examination or inspection
of the premises or property of any taxpayer shall not be divulged or
disclosed by the director or any other person who may have obtained
these records and files.
(B) It is the specific intent of this chapter that all tax returns, audit
reports, and information pertaining to any tax returns ... shall not be
subject to the provisions of [the FOIA].
Aim. CODE ANN. § 26-18-303(a) (Michie Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). The com-
missioner argued that the statute prevented disclosure of the motor fuel tax records
sought by the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the statute required denial of
access only to individual tax returns. The court agreed with the plaintiff. 288 Ark.
at 81, 702 S.W.2d at 23.
61. 288 Ark. at 85, 702 S.W.2d at 25.
62. Id. at 85-86, 702 S.W.2d at 25.
63. 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 226, 766 S.W.2d at 912.
66. Id. at 225-26, 766 S.W.2d at 912.
67. Id. at 226, 766 S.W.2d at 912.
68. Legislative Joint Auditing Comm. v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 90, 722 S.W.2d
581, 582 (1987) (citing Watkins, supra note 18, at 741).
1994]
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exemptions for a variety of reasons.6 9 In Arkansas, the working
papers exemption was enacted to protect the "work product" of
the decision-making process and to encourage the frank exchange
of ideas during that process.70 For the first time the exemption
became the principal issue of a supreme court case in Legislative
Joint Auditing Committee v. Woosley.71 In Woosley, a newspaper
sought release of notes and records that were used to compile an
audit of a county circuit clerk's office.7 2 The audit was made
available, but the notes were not. 73 The trial court granted access
to the notes despite the auditors' claim that the notes fell under
the working papers exemption granted to legislators.7 4 The auditors
argued that, as employees of a legislative committee, their notes
were not subject to public disclosure. 75 The supreme court affirmed
the trial court and stated:
The working papers of an auditor who is a state employee
cannot be deemed the private papers of individual legislators
[whose papers are exempt] without completely disregarding the
plain and simple language of the FOIA. The act does not exempt
working papers of employees of a legislative committee, only
those of the legislators. 76
The supreme court again narrowly construed the working pa-
pers exemption in City of Fayetteville v. Edmark.7 7 In Edmark,
the court held that an outside attorney doing work for a munic-
ipality becomes, for purposes of the FOIA, a city attorney, and
69. For a comprehensive compilation of FOIA statutes, see Burt A. Braverman
and Wesley R. Heppler, A Practical Review of State Open Records Laws, 49 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 720 (1981). A majority of states exempt information made con-
fidential by a state or federal statute, information gathered by law enforcement
olftcials In investigations, and personal privacv information. Id. at 740-41. 745-46.
Approximately one-third of the'states exempt trade secets or commercial information,
the release of which would cause injury to a company's competitive position. Id.
at 741-43. More than one-third of the states exempt preliminary departmental
memoranda of governmental agencies. Id. at 743-45. Finally, ten states have an
exemption which protects information that relates to litigation against a public
body. Id. at 746.
70. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 228, 766 S.W.2d 909,
913 (1989).
71. Legislative Joint Auditing Comm. v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 722 S.W.2d
581 (1987).
72. Id. at 90-91, 722 S.W.2d at 582.
73. Id. at 90, 722 S.W.2d at 582.
74. Id. at 92, 722 S.W.2d at 583.
75. Id. at 91, 722 S.W.2d at 583.
76. Id. at 92, 722 S.W.2d at 583.
77. 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990).
[Vol. 16:313
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his records therefore become public records subject to public dis-
closure. 78 Similarly, in Scott v. Smith,79 the court held that the
working papers exemption was not available to an Arkansas De-
partment of Human Services attorney.80 The court determined that
there was no exemption for the attorney-client privilege applicable
to state agency records.8" Consequently, records in the possession
of the agency's attorneys are subject to public disclosure.8 2
The court rejected another attempt to deny access to litigation
files in Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department v. Hope
Brick Works."' In Hope Brick Works, attorneys for the Arkansas
Highway and Transportation Department argued that their working
papers were exempt under the FOIA.8 4 The attorneys were not
members of the attorney general's staff, but were internal highway
department employees.85 The court, relying on Scott v. Smith, 6
held that the working papers exemption did not apply to litigation
files maintained by attorneys representing state agencies.87 The court
again refused to create an exemption to the FOIA based on the
attorney-client privilege. 8
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT IN BRYANT
In Bryant v. Mars, 9 the Arkansas Supreme Court considered
a trial judge's ruling that the working papers exemption was avail-
able only to the officeholder personally and not his assistants or
outside consultants. 9° After first determining that the records sought
by the appellee fell within the definition of a "public record," 9'
78. Id. at 186-87, 801 S.W.2d at 279.
79. 292 Ark. 174, 728 S.W.2d 515 (1987).
80. Id. at 176, 728 S.W.2d at 516.
81. Id. at 176, 728 S.W.2d at 515.
82. Id. at 174, 728 S.W.2d at 515. The appellants in Scott raised the issue of
the working papers exemption only in relation to the Department of Human Services
attorney and not to an assistant attorney general who also possessed the documents
sought by the appellee. Id. at 175, 728 S.W.2d at 515.
83. Arkansas Highway and Transp. Dep't v. Hope Brick Works, 294 Ark. 490,
744 S.W.2d 711 (1988).
84. Id. at 492, 744 S.W.2d at 712.
85. Appellants' Brief at 16, Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 830 S.W.2d 869
(1992) (No. 91-262).
86. 292 Ark. 174, 728 S.W.2d 515 (1987).
87. 294 Ark. at 495, 744 S.W.2d at 714.
88. Id.
89. 309 Ark. 480, 830 S.W.2d 869 (1992).
90. Id. at 481, 830 S.W.2d at 869.
91. Id. at 482-83, 830 S.W.2d at 870. The FOIA defines "public records" as:
writings, recorded sounds, films, tapes, or data compilations in any form,
19941
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the court addressed the issue of whether the statutory exemption
for working papers of the attorney general extended to assistant
attorneys general. 92 While remarking that existing case law on the
issue was anilluminating and even appeared to be in conflict, 93 the
court reviewed Scott 94 and Hope Brick Works95 and attached great
precedential value to the distinction between state agency records
and records held by the officials whose papers are specifically
exempted by the FOIA.
96
The court did not attempt to distinguish Woosley;97 indeed,
it acknowledged that Woosley favored the appellee. 98 The court
suggested that the implication created by Woosley, that only "pri-
vate papers" of legislators are exempted and not those of legislative
assistants,99 is an acceptable conclusion.'00
required by law to be kept or otherwise kept, and which constitute a
record of the performance or lack of performance of official functions
which are or should be carried out by a public official or employee, a
governmental agency, or any other agency wholly or partially supported
by public funds or expending public funds. All records maintained in
public offices or by public employees within the scope of their employment
shall be presumed to be public records.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(l) (Michie 1992).
92. 309 Ark. at 483, 830 S.W.2d at 871.
93. Id. The court seemed unsettled by the incongruous opinions of Ark. Highway
and Transp. Dep't v. Hope Brick Works, 294 Ark. 490, 744 S.W.2d 711 (1988)
and Scott v. Smith, 292 Ark. 174, 728 S.W.2d 515 (1987). In Scott there was no
appeal of a trial court ruling that documents held by an assistant attorney general
were exempted from the FOIA as working papers (the appeal concerned only an
agency attorney). In Hope Brick Works the court appeared to ratify the trial court's
ruling in Scott. The conflict about which the court in Bryant expressed concern
appears to be the result of the failure in Scott to appeal the issue with respect to
the assistant attorney general. Id.
94. Scott v. Smith, 292 Ark. 174, 728 S.W.2d 515 (1987). Scott held that files
of Department of Human Services .......... wcrc not entite to A emtin
Id. at 176, 728 S.W.2d at 516.
95. Arkansas Highway and Transp. Dep't v. Hope Brick Works, 294 Ark. 490,
744 S.W.2d 711 (1988). The court in Hope Brick Works rejected the argument
that the FOIA does not apply to litigation files. Id. at 495, 744 S.W.2d at 714.
96. 309 Ark. at 483-84, 830 S.W.2d at 871.
97. Woosley held that the working papers of state auditors employed by the
Legislative Joint Auditing Committee were not exempt from disclosure under the
working papers exemption of the FOIA. Legislative Joint Auditing Comm. v.
Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 93, 722 S.W.2d 581, 584 (1987); see supra notes 71-76 and
accompanying text.
98. 309 Ark. at 484, 830 S.W.2d at 871. The decision in Woosley turned on
the court's finding that documents which were created by an auditor, though
employed by a committee created by the legislature, could not be the "private
papers" of a legislator. 291 Ark. at 92, 722 S.W.2d at 583.
99. 291 Ark. 89, 722 S.W.2d 581 (1987).
100. 309 Ark. at 484, 830 S.W.2d at 871.
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While reaffirming its general policy that the FOIA must be
liberally construed,' 0 the court wrote that it was "aware of the
need for a balancing of interests' 0 °2 to put into effect what it
perceived to be the intent of the legislature. 03 The court seemed
willing to accept the notion that the term "attorney general," as
used in the Act, meant more than the single person who served
as attorney general.'0 4 Citing Judge Richard Posner, 05 the court
said that judges are often faced with the responsibility of placing
themselves in legislators' shoes to determine what the legislators
intended when drafting the statute.' °6 The court held that to ef-
fectuate the legislature's intent, the term "attorney general" should
be given its common and ordinary meaning, which, according to
the court, included not only the officeholder personally but his
staff members as well.1
0 7
Finally, the court held that the documents generated by the
private consultants were also exempt as working papers under the
FOIA. 10 8 The court was forced to distinguish Edmark,0 9 where it
had held that an outside attorney doing work for a city was a
public employee whose records were subject to disclosure." 0 It
distinguished the earlier case by noting that there was no statutory
exemption in Edmark similar to the exemption at issue in Bryant."'
The court determined that the consultants' papers were entitled
to the same protection afforded the working papers of the attorney
general and were therefore exempt." 2
IV. SIGNIFICANCE
After Bryant v. Mars, it is clear that the law in Arkansas is
that assistant attorneys general and private consultants are both
101. See Ragland v. Yeargen, 288 Ark. 81, 702 S.W.2d 23 (1986); Laman v.
McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
102. See generally McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766
S.W.2d 909 (1989); Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 282 Ark.
194, 667 S.W.2d 648 (1984).
103. 309 Ark. at 485, 830 S.W.2d at 872.
104. Id. at 484, 830 S.W.2d at 872.
105. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
106. 309 Ark. at 484-85, 830 S.W.2d at 871-72 (citing POSNER, supra note 105,
at 273).
107. 309 Ark. at 485, 830 S.W.2d at 872.
108. Id.
109. City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990).
110. Id. at 189, 801 S.W.2d at 280.




covered by the "attorney general" exemption." 3 What is not clear
after Bryant is whether the court's interpretation of the working
papers exemption would extend to members of the governor's staff
or members of the staffs of the justices of the supreme court."
4
Additionally, it is not clear whether non-committee legislative staff
members' papers would be entitled to the exemption." 5 It is not
inconceivable that the court would find that the working papers
exemption does cover the personal staffs of legislators, supreme
court justices, and the governor. Further, exactly how the court
might define "correspondence" is unclear.
1 6
The court's decision in Bryant follows the national trend,'
which seems to be to provide protection to the working papers
of executive officeholders." 8 Further, the additional holding in
Bryant, that outside consultants are entitled to the working papers
exemption, is supported in many jurisdictions."a9
113. See Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 485-86, 830 S.W.2d 869, 872 (1992).
114. The working papers exemption provides protection to "[unpublished mem-
oranda, working papers, and correspondence of the Governor, Members of the
General Assembly, Supreme Court Justices, and the Attorney General." ARK. CODE
ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(7) (Michie Supp. 1993).
115. The court refused to extend the working papers exemption to notes of the
staff of the Joint Auditing Committee. Legislative Joint Auditing Comm. v. Woosley,
291 Ark. 89, 722 S.W.2d 581 (1987).
116. See JOHN J. WATKINS, THE ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 76-
77 (1988).
117. See, e.g., Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 136 (Va. 1991) (holding
that an itemized list of long distance telephone calls placed by the governor's office
fit within the exemption for "memoranda, working papers, and correspondence
and was not required to be disclosed"); Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1978)
(ruling that the results of a character investigation requested by the governor were
not "public records" since the investigation was discretionary); Mathews v. Pyle,
251 P.2d 093 (, , Inc-ilk." 7J.Az. 1952) holding that documents and other information received
by the governor as a result of an investigation of the state land office were not
"public records"). But see Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240
(Cal. 1991) (ruling that the correspondence exemption only applies to letters;
consequently, a governor's appointment calendars and schedules are not within the
exemption).
118. Telephone Interview with Alan Janesch, Director of Intergovernmental Re-
lations, National Governors' Association (June 1992).
119. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Town of Webster, 480 N.E.2d 74 (N.Y. 1985)
(holding that "[o]pinions and recommendations that would ... be exempt from
disclosure under [FOIA! as 'intra-agency materials,' . . ." if prepared by agency
employees, "do not lose their exempt status simply because they are prepared for
the agency . . . by an outside consultant"). In re Austin v. Purcell, 478 N.Y.S.2d
64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (ruling that although prepared by an outside entity,
consultant's reports are treated as intra-agency material for purposes of disclosure
under the FOIA). But see DeMaria Bldg. Co. v. Department of Management and
Budget, 407 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a report of an
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PUBLIC LAW
What may be most significant about the Bryant decision is
the court's apparent retreat from its self-imposed rule of construing
FOIA exemptions narrowly . 20 One commentator has noted that
two basic principles, inter alia, have guided the Arkansas Supreme
Court in its consideration of FOIA cases.' 21 Having consistently
interpreted FOIA exemptions as narrowly as possible, the first
principle guiding the court is that where the scope of an exemption
is unclear, it will be construed in a manner that favors disclosure. 122
The second principle is a legal presumption in favor of disclosure,
manifested in a requirement that entities who oppose disclosure
of a document bear the burden of showing that the document
should not be disclosed. 23 In the sense that the court in Bryant
seemed to retreat from this long-standing policy of construing
FOIA exemptions narrowly, it is possible that the decision is an
aberration-a case limited by its facts. In the alternative, the court
may have begun with Bryant to consider FOIA cases in a new
and different manner. Future cases with different facts will prove
which theory is accurate.
Finally, there was support in Arkansas for the Bryant decision
from an unlikely corner. One of the last editorials published in
the Arkansas Gazette argued that the court should extend the
working papers exemption to cover assistant attorneys general. 24
The editorial appealed to the court's common sense: "Naturally,
the attorney general himself files and tries very few lawsuits. What
public purpose would be served to allow him to keep his notes,
memoranda and correspondence secret, but to reveal those of the
60 lawyers in his office who actually do the work?' 125
Robert William Schroeder III
independent consultant to a public body did not fall under FOIA exemption for
communications and notes within a public body or between bodies of an advisory
nature).
120. Legislative Joint Auditing Comm. v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 722 S.W.2d
581 (1987); Ragland v. Yeargan, 288 Ark. 81, 702 S.W.2d 23 (1986); Laman v.
McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
121. WATKINS, supra note 24, at 61.
122. WATKINS, supra note 24, at 61.
123. WATKINS, supra note 24, at 61 n.36 (citing Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-
130 ("ruling that the burden of going forward with the evidence and proving
compliance with the law is cast upon the party opposing the application of the
Freedom of Information Act")).
124. This Time, FOI Shouldn't Apply, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Sept. 6, 1991, at
8B.
125. Id.
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